Blame-Shifting in Presidential Systems: Corrective Effect of Ministerial Terminations on Approval

Abstract

How do ministerial terminations affect presidential approval? Presidents face unexpected challenges related to stochastic events such as scandals, policy failures or economic crises. We argue that the termination of ministers who have received calls for their resignation presents an opportunity for the president to send signals to the electorate in the expectation of a corrective effect on popularity through a blame-shifting dynamic. The central argument is that this dynamic only occurs in coalition governments where political responsibility may be more easily attributed to the coalition’s different parties and factions, weakening personalisation centred on the president and facilitating blame-shifting and the corrective effect. The expectation of a corrective effect on approval is tested using instrumental variables (IV) regressions applied to novel data on ministerial terminations and resignation calls in 124 governments in 12 presidential democracies. The data were gathered by combining data mining, machine learning techniques and survey marginal time series based on the dyad ratios algorithm for approval. The main findings support the expectation that individual terminations of tainted ministers generate a corrective effect of nine points on presidential approval in coalition governments, which decreases in the medium and long term.

Bastián González-Bustamante

Post-doctoral Researcher

Post-doctoral Researcher in Computational Social Science and a lecturer in Governance and Development at the Institute of Public Administration at the Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs at Leiden University, Netherlands.